Spontaneous Fluctuations and Non-linear Ignitions: Two Dynamic Faces of Cortical Recurrent Loops  by Moutard, Clément et al.
Neuron
PerspectiveSpontaneous Fluctuations and Non-linear Ignitions:
Two Dynamic Faces of Cortical Recurrent LoopsCle´ment Moutard,1,2,3 Stanislas Dehaene,1,2,3,4 and Rafael Malach5,*
1Institut National de la Sante´ et de la Recherche Me´dicale, U992, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, NeuroSpin Center, Saclay Center, 91191
Gif-sur-Yvette, France
2Commissariat a` l’Energie Atomique, Division of Life Sciences, Institute of BioImaging, NeuroSpin Center, 91191 Gif-sur-Yvette, France
3Universite´ Paris-Sud, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, 91405 Orsay Cedex, France
4Colle`ge de France, Place Marcelin Berthelot, 75005 Paris, France
5Department of Neurobiology, Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot 76100, Israel
*Correspondence: rafi.malach@gmail.com
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2015.09.018
Recent human neurophysiological recordings have uncovered two fundamental modes of cerebral cortex ac-
tivity with distinct dynamics: an active mode characterized by a rapid and sustained activity (‘‘ignition’’) and a
spontaneous (resting-state) mode, manifesting ultra-slow fluctuations of low amplitude. We propose that
both dynamics reflect two faces of the same recurrent loop mechanism: an integration device that accumu-
lates ongoing stochastic activity and, either spontaneously or in a task-driven manner, crosses a dynamic
threshold and ignites, leading to content-specific awareness. The hypothesis can explain a rich set of behav-
ioral and neuronal phenomena, such as perceptual threshold, the high non-linearity of visual responses, the
subliminal nature of spontaneous activity fluctuations, and the slow activity buildup anticipating sponta-
neous behavior (e.g., readiness potential). Further elaborations of this unified scheme, such as a cascade
of integrators with different ignition thresholds or multi-stable states, can account for additional complexities
in the repertoire of human cortical dynamics.Introduction: Two Modes of Cortical Function
Traditionally, research of human cortical function has focused
on mapping the neuronal activations triggered by supra-
threshold stimuli and well-defined tasks. Similar to numerous
studies in animal models, measurements in the human cortex
also revealed that the central characteristic of optimal neuronal
responses consists of rapidly emerging bursts of neuronal activ-
ity. Taking the human sensory cortex as a well-researched
example, cortical activations to optimal stimuli were shown to
be reflected in bursts of high firing rates in single neurons re-
corded invasively in patients undergoing clinical diagnosis for
epilepsy (e.g., Bitterman et al., 2008; Nir et al., 2007), in an
increase of broadband gamma power during invasive electro-
corticography (ECoG) recordings in patients (Nir et al., 2007;
Manning et al., 2009), in large blood-oxygen-level-dependent
(BOLD) responses in fMRI scans (e.g., Heeger and Ress,
2002; Mukamel et al., 2005), and in electroencephalography
(EEG) and magnetoencephalography (MEG) as reflected in large
event-related potential (ERP) responses (e.g., Ha¨ma¨la¨inen et al.,
1993; Gao et al., 2013).
Particularly for sensory systems, it was assumed that in the
absence of a stimulus (e.g., in complete darkness), the sensory
cortex enters an uninformative, low-level baseline mode. How-
ever, following the pioneering research of Arieli et al. (1996) in
anesthetized animals, paralleled with BOLD fMRI recordings in
the human motor cortex by Biswal et al. (1995), numerous
studies have, by now, established that in the absence of a stim-
ulus or task—in what has been termed the ‘‘resting state’’—
cortical networks enter into a highly informative mode of sponta-
neous activity. In contrast to the active mode, these so-called194 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.resting-state fluctuations are characterized by low-amplitude
modulations of activity and ultra-slow (<0.1 Hz) dynamics.
Although most research on resting-state fluctuations has relied
on BOLD imaging, subsequent research has confirmed their ex-
istence also in firing-rate modulations (Nir et al., 2008), ECoG
recordings (He et al., 2008; Nir et al., 2008), and scalp EEG
(Schurger et al., 2015), following on the seminal studies of Berger
and colleagues (e.g., Niedermeyer and da Silva, 2005).
Importantly, the slow spontaneous fluctuations are not con-
fined to specific resting-state networks but emerge in each
and every cortical site that has been studied so far. For example,
the human visual cortex shows widely spread and highly struc-
tured spontaneous BOLD fluctuations in the absence of visual
inputs (e.g., Arcaro et al., 2015; Nir et al., 2006). The structure
of the spontaneous fluctuations appears to be highly informative
and likely reflects the statistics of the natural environment and
cognitive traits (Berkes et al., 2011; Harmelech and Malach,
2013). The structure and ubiquity of these fluctuations suggest
that they may constitute an important mode of cortical function.
Figure 1 compares the two modes of cortical function as re-
vealed in single units recorded in the auditory cortex of patients
in the course of diagnostic procedure for epilepsy (modified from
Bitterman et al., 2008; Nir et al., 2008). Shown are stimulus-
driven, active responses (Figure 1A) versus resting-state sponta-
neous fluctuations in firing rates (Figure 1B). The most striking
difference that can be readily appreciated is the transition from
rapid-burst dynamics in the active mode—in which bursts
develop within a fraction of a second in a response to an auditory
stimulation—to low-amplitude ultra-slow fluctuation dynamics
during resting mode, when there is no auditory stimulus and
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Figure 1. Two Modes of Cortical Function
Examples of active and resting-state spontaneous
modes reflected in firing of the same neurons re-
corded from human auditory cortex.
(A) Responses to tones of specific frequency
(modified from Bitterman et al., 2008).
(B) Spontaneous activity generated in the absence
of auditory stimulation. Note the strikingly different
timescales characterizing the two phenomena
(modified from Nir et al., 2008).
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two modes, which seem to have such drastically different dy-
namic properties, may originate from the same network mecha-
nism of excitatory reverberatory loops.
Neuronal Mechanisms Underlying the Active Mode
At least within the domain of sensory system neurophysiology, a
number of experimental results suggest that, in addition to the
well-documented bottom-up and top-down flow of information,
there is a thirdmajor component that consists of strong reverber-
atory interactions relying on lateral connections. Such lateral
recurrent interactions can readily lead to highly non-linear posi-
tive-feedback dynamics.
An important cortical phenomenon that appears to reflect
such non-linear behavior concerns the threshold nonlinearities
observed in the input-output relationship between a sensory
stimulus and the neuronal response. A consistent observation
when gradually increasing the intensity of a weak sensory stim-
ulus—for example, by constraining participants to view a briefly
presented stimulus interrupted by amask (‘‘backward-masking’’
method reviewed in Kouider and Dehaene, 2007; Figure 2A)—is
that the neuronal response is not linearly related to the increase
in strength of the physical stimulus (e.g., exposure duration or
target-mask delay) but shows a highly non-linear, typically
steeply sigmoid function (e.g., visual awareness with EEG con-
trast response in Del Cul et al., 2007; and with contrasted
BOLD activity in Grill-Spector et al., 2000; or auditory awareness
in Gutschalk et al., 2008). Thus, there is a range of values, both
low and high, in which changing the stimulus intensity only
marginally affects the neuronal response, while in a rather narrow
range of values (which are termed the sensory ‘‘threshold’’),
minimal changes in the stimulus intensity lead to greatly amplified
neuronal activity. Such neuronal response non-linearity has been
demonstrated across allmeasurementmodalities fromBOLD im-
aging (Bar et al., 2001; Grill-Spector et al., 2000;Hesselmann andNeuron 88Malach, 2011), MEG and EEG recordings
(Lamy et al., 2009; Sekar et al., 2013;
Wyart et al., 2012), ECoG recordings
(Fisch et al., 2009), and even single-
unit recordings in medial-temporal lobe
structures (Quiroga et al., 2008). Even for
a fixed stimulus presented close to
threshold, the neural response may be
bimodal, indexing the subject’s report:
high activity is observed on trials when
the subject reports perceiving the stim-
ulus, and low or no activity is observed
when he or she reports being unable to perceive it (Fisch et al.,
2009; Quiroga et al., 2008; Sergent et al., 2005).
A second informative aspect of these non-linear responses is
their sustained nature: once a neuronal response crosses the
threshold, changing or even removing the sensory input does
not shut off the neuronal response, which remains at a high
value for durations of up to a few hundred milliseconds. This
phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 2, which depicts a typical
backward-masking paradigm (Figure 2A) and two examples
of threshold phenomena revealed during backward masking.
In Figure 2B (modified from Fisch et al., 2009), ECoG re-
cordings from face-selective sites in patients show that, at
threshold, the very same stimulus (a briefly flashed face) can
lead to a highly amplified signal when reported as perceived
(red line) and to much a smaller response when reported as un-
perceived (blue line). In Figure 2D (modified from Dehaene and
Changeux, 2011), depicting BOLD-fMRI signals recorded from
the word-form area, a striking amplification of the signal is
evident at threshold for consciously perceived versus non-
perceived words (Dehaene et al., 2001). Furthermore, the sus-
tained nature of the ‘‘ignited’’ response can be appreciated in
Figure 2B by noting that the neuronal response upon perceiving
the target lasts for several hundreds of milliseconds, while the
target-stimulus duration itself was less than 20 ms. It should
be noted that this sustained ‘‘ignition’’ effect cannot be attrib-
uted merely to the first stages of the cortical hierarchy. It has
been demonstrated that non-linear responses in high-order
cortical areas can emerge in the absence of such effects in
earlier cortical stages (Bar et al., 2001; Del Cul et al., 2007;
Fisch et al., 2009; Grill-Spector et al., 2000; Kouider et al.,
2013).
Mechanisms Underlying the Ignition Threshold
The respective roles of local versus global long-distance network
phenomena in such ignitions are not fully established and remain, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 195
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Figure 2. Neuronal and Perceptual Evidence
for Threshold Non-linearity Ignition in the
Human Visual System
(A) The backward-masking experimental paradigm,
which allows precise timing of stimulus presenta-
tion and has been used extensively to uncover
ignition dynamics (modified from Fisch et al., 2009).
SOA, stimulus-onset asynchrony.
(B) Intracranially recorded ECoG responses from
human high-order, face-selective sites, showing
activation to perceived and non-perceived face
stimuli at threshold. Note the high signal amplitude
and relatively sustained responses, which far
outlast the duration of the presented stimulus
(indicated by the purple bar; modified from Fisch
et al., 2009).
(C) Behavioral evidence of an all-or none perceptual
response during the backward-masking paradigm.
Despite gradual changes in stimulus strength, both
objective and subjective responses show a clear
bifurcation into visible and non-visible states
(modified from Del Cul et al., 2007).
(D) BOLD-fMRI responses from the human
visual word-form area demonstrating the highly
nonlinear amplification of BOLD signal associated
with crossing the perceptual threshold during
visual perception of words (modified from Dehaene
and Changeux, 2011). Error bars indicate
means ± SEM.
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global ignitions are revealed under various conditions (e.g., De-
haene and Changeux, 2005; Fisch et al., 2009; Noy et al.,
2015). A plausible model for their generation is readily suggested
by noting the dense lateral intra- and inter-areal connections that
characterize cortical networks (e.g., Amir et al., 1993; Douglas
and Martin, 1991; see review by Felleman and Van Essen,
1991). These lateral connections are mainly excitatory, making
them highly susceptible to entering into a positive feedback
reverberatory dynamics, once the net excitatory drive over-
comes the strong inhibitory and leakage control. Such net
excitation, emerging in densely and reciprocally connected net-
works, can readily lead to a fast and non-linear ignition. Figure 3
illustrates, using a simulation of a minimal one-dimensional dy-
namic system (see formal description in Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures and also see Figure S1), how such non-linear
ignitions emerge naturally in a recurrent network (Figure 3A, top).
The dynamic consequences of having the net excitation exceed
the inhibitory suppression (Figure 3A, bottom left) are depicted
in Figure 3B. Note the sustained and high activity that follows196 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.stimulus onset, which resembles the ex-
perimentally observed dynamics (e.g.,
compare to Figure 2B).
More detailed network models of rever-
beratory activity also predict the emer-
gence of non-linear ignitions (Dehaene
and Changeux, 2005; Dehaene et al.,
2003; Martı´ et al., 2008; Wong and Wang,
2006) or even an extremely rapid nonlinear
‘‘network spike’’ (e.g., Tsodyks et al.,
2000). It should be noted that the steep-
ness of the signal rise, corresponding toa short time constant during the ignition, does not necessarily
imply a short-latency response following, e.g., a visual stimulus.
Thus, an ignition can occur after a long delay of ‘‘dormant’’ activ-
ity. Indeed, bursts of visual responses were shown to emerge in
the human medial temporal lobe only after rather a long period
(>300 ms in Quiroga et al., 2008). Such long delays may be
due either to long subliminal buildup time following the stimulus
presentation (discussed later) or to a long chain of intermediate
links.
Simulations suggest that NMDA glutamate receptors, with
their slow dynamics, may play a specific role in inducing a pro-
longed ignited state (Wong and Wang, 2006). In Dehaene and
Changeux’s (Dehaene et al., 2003; Dehaene and Changeux,
2005) simulations, NMDA receptors were specifically allocated
to recurrent top-down connections. This hypothesis was re-
cently borne out experimentally, as late sustained activity in
V1 was selectively affected by NMDA receptor blockers (Self
et al., 2012), while the early feed-forward wave was spared.
It should be noted that recurrent networks tend to self-ignite




Figure 3. Illustration of the Network Dynamics Below and Above the Ignition Threshold
(A) The structure of the local recurrent network used for the illustration; the parameters of the network were specifically chosen to demonstrate the feasibility of the
observed dynamics (inspired from Martı´ et al., 2008).
(B) Illustration of the active ignited dynamics. Note the steep buildup and sustained high activity associated with crossing the threshold.
(C) Illustration of the resting-state, spontaneous dynamics. Note that the same network enters ultra-slow fluctuation dynamics when below the ignition threshold.
(D) Long anticipatory build-up. Even in the absence of external driving input, the slow fluctuations may spontaneously cross the ignition threshold initiating a rapid
signal amplification. Dark green indicates an average over 50 trials; light green indicates a single-trial example.
Neuron
Perspective(Dehaene and Changeux, 2005) and in isolated neural tissue
(e.g., Eytan and Marom, 2006). Thus, both modeling work and
characteristic cortical circuitry point to reverberatory network
activity as a prominent mechanism that could drive the non-
linear ignition process. However, we emphasize that the assign-
ment of the non-linear ignition to reverberating connections is
tentative at this point. Other neurobiological mechanisms based
on inhibitory loops (e.g., Lo and Wang, 2006) or on non-linear
dendritic events (Larkum, 2013) may play important roles as
well. Particularly interesting is the observation of a zone for the
initiation of calcium action potentials (Ca2+ spikes) in the apical
dendrites of layer 5 pyramidal neurons (Larkum and Zhu,
2002), which is described as ‘‘a tremendously explosive engine,
driving the L5 pyramidal cell to fire repetitively when ignited’’
(Larkum, 2013, p. 141). Recurrent feedback from distant cortical
areas is ideally suited to trigger this dendritic ignition phenome-
non, as such feedback lands simultaneously onto supragranular
apical and on infragranular layers (van Kerkoerle et al., 2014),
thus simultaneously contacting the apical and somatic dendrites
of pyramidal L5 cells in the target area. There is direct evidence
that this top-downmechanism plays a causal role in the late igni-
tion of somatosensory cortex in response to a tactile stimulus in
mice and that interfering with it suffices to prevent the perception
of tactile inputs (Manita et al., 2015).
Behavioral Correlates of Neuronal Ignitions
A significant issue, which can be studied particularly effectively
in humans, concerns the perceptual correlates of the ignition dy-
namics. The threshold non-linearity which is a major ‘‘signature’’
of the ignition process finds a ready counterpart in the highlynonlinear input-output relationships observed in sensory psy-
chophysics (e.g., Sergent and Dehaene, 2004; Wilson and
Bergen, 1979). Figure 2C (modified from Del Cul et al., 2007) de-
picts a detailed illustration of such psychophysical threshold
derived from backward masking. Note the highly non-linear
transition in subjective visibility reports from seen to unseen
targets, despite a gradual change in the physical stimulation
parameter. Importantly, both objective and subjective behavioral
effects appear to follow such threshold non-linearity. Thus, the
threshold non-linearity was evident even when participants’ re-
ports were based on subjective, graded evaluations.
The all-or-none character of conscious perception has been
observed in a variety of paradigms, including masking (Del Cul
et al., 2007; Grill-Spector et al., 2000), visual search (Aly and Yo-
nelinas, 2012), attentional blink (Sergent and Dehaene, 2004;
Wierda et al., 2012), attentional selection in time and space
(Vul et al., 2009), working memory retrieval (Zhang and Luck,
2009), and long-term memory recollection (Harlow and Donald-
son, 2013).
Brain imaging and neurophysiological research has examined
the relationship between psychophysical and neuronal thresh-
olds, establishing tight links between these two manifestations
of threshold non-linearity. Thus, in BOLD imaging, Grill-Spector
et al. (2000) have demonstrated, during the backward-masking
paradigm, that BOLD activation in object-selective cortical sites
was amplified at threshold, in parallel with the participants’ ability
to correctly recognize the briefly presented images. Crucially,
following perceptual training, which lowered the recognition
threshold, Grill-Spector et al. were able to demonstrate that
the BOLD ignition threshold covaried with the induced changesNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 197
Box 1. Current Status of the Field
d Each cortical site may be subject to two fundamental
modes of cortical dynamics: fast, high-amplitude, task-
driven activity and ultra-slow, low-amplitude, resting-state
activity.
d During sensory stimulation, a linear increase in stimulus
parameters may be associated with a non-linear ignition
dynamics, in which crossing a threshold leads to signal
amplification and sustained activity, seen in all modalities
of brain recording (EEG, BOLD-fMRI, intracranial ECoG re-
cordings, and single-unit recordings).
d Behavioral evidence is compatible with the existence of an
all-or-none state of conscious perception in a variety of
paradigms, including masking, visual search, attentional
blink, attentional selection in time and space, working
memory retrieval, and long-term memory recollection.
d Ultra-slow resting-state fluctuations have been demon-
strated in fMRI, EEG, ECoG, and single-unit recordings
at every cortical site.
d Spontaneous behaviors such as decision to move, free
recall, and spontaneous pupillary dilations are all charac-
terized by a slow buildup of neuronal activity ‘‘anticipating’’
the spontaneous decisions.
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studies, crossing of the perceptual threshold during backward
masking is concomitant with a non-linear amplification of the
BOLD and ERP signals (Dehaene et al., 2001; Del Cul et al.,
2007). Using ECoG recording in face-selective sites in patients
during such backward-masking paradigms, Fisch et al. (2009)
were able to demonstrate that crossing the perceptual recogni-
tion threshold was linked to a robust amplification of neuronal
activity (Figures 2A and 2B). Finally, a highly non-linear firing of
medial temporal neurons was reported by Quiroga et al. (2008)
to be closely associated with patients’ recognition threshold,
even on a trial-by-trial basis.
To summarize (see Box 1, ‘‘Current Status of the Field’’),
studies of perception and neuronal activity converge in point-
ing to a clear correspondence between the ignition and psy-
chophysical thresholds. Simply stated, these studies suggest
that the dividing line between conscious and subconscious
processes is delineated by the neuronal threshold leading to
ignition.
Neuronal Mechanisms Underlying the Spontaneous,
Resting-State, Mode
In striking contrast to the rapidly evolving, high-amplitude igni-
tions associated with stimulus-driven neuronal activations, the
resting-state mode is characterized by ultra-slow fluctuations
of activity, often taking seconds to develop (see Figure 1A).
Detailed analysis of the power spectra of these resting-state ac-
tivity fluctuations conducted in invasive recordings in patients
reveal a scale-free power-law function (He et al., 2008; Nir
et al., 2008; Podvalny et al., 2015). While, in BOLD imaging,
the spontaneous fluctuations appear to be similar in amplitude
to task-driven activations (Nir et al., 2006; Raichle and Mintun,198 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.2006), it is important to caution that it is difficult to infer, from
such amplitude comparisons, the firing rates of the underlying
neuronal populations. Specifically, short, high firing-rate bursts
may produce lower amplitude BOLD activations than low
but sustained neuronal activations. Single-unit recordings com-
paring optimal auditory stimulation with the fluctuations during
silent rest reveal that sensory-driven activations produce signif-
icantly higher firing rates than the no-stimulus spontaneous fluc-
tuations (Nir et al., 2008), but clearly, additional single-neuron
data are needed to validate the generality of this observation.
However, the power-law function characterizing spontaneous
fluctuations, while highlighting the important contribution of
ultra-slow fluctuations, also reveals some contributions from
higher frequencies as well. In fact, indications for such faster
contributions have been recently reported in BOLD-fMRI mea-
surements (e.g., Chen et al., 2015).
A fundamental feature of spontaneous fluctuations is their
ubiquity across the cortex. A large and rapidly growing body of
research reveals that, remarkably, each and every cortical site
has the potential to exhibit such spontaneous fluctuations, albeit
with a different level of correlation to other cortical loci (e.g.,
Damoiseaux et al., 2006; Fox and Raichle, 2007). This is an
important observation, not only because of its potentially clinical
significance as a method that ‘‘self-diagnoses’’ each cortical
network (e.g., Greicius et al., 2004; Hahamy et al., 2015; Han
et al., 2011; Harmelech and Malach, 2013), but because it indi-
cates that the spontaneous dynamics may reflect a common
or even canonical cortical phenomenon. Thus, revealing the
neuronal machinery that generates the spontaneous resting-
state fluctuations will constitute a major advance in our under-
standing of cortical function.
A central challenge when considering the neuronal mecha-
nisms that underlie the spontaneous fluctuations is to explain
their extremely slow timescales, which likely point to a large
memory capacity of the fluctuating network. At present, similar
to the case of the ignition dynamics, the exact biophysical mech-
anisms that generate spontaneous resting-state fluctuations
remain unknown. However, a number of modeling studies have
begun to unravel possible neuronal mechanisms, specifically
relying on experimentally observed network structures, that
could account for the experimentally observed resting-state
fluctuations (Deco et al., 2011; Honey et al., 2007).
Interestingly, models that attempted to simulate slow neuronal
dynamics have proposed a reverberatory circuit mechanism as
the source of such persistent activity (Martı´ et al., 2008; Okamoto
et al., 2007; Schurger et al., 2012;Wang, 2002). Notably, the slow
dynamics could not be explained in such models by isolated
cellular synaptic mechanisms and depended on the presence
of strong excitatory reverberations. In Figures 3A and 3C, we
illustrate how a simple one-dimensional simulation of a recurrent
network generates the slow stochastic dynamics typical of the
resting mode (compare Figure 3C with Figure 1B). Additionally,
homogeneous, balanced networks of uniformly connected
excitatory neurons cannot computationally explain the slow
spontaneous fluctuations, but homogeneous clustered networks
can (Litwin-Kumar and Doiron, 2012). The latter architectural
constraint of clustered connectivity is, of course, typical of cor-
tical architecture (Perin et al., 2011; Song et al., 2005; Amir
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Perspectiveet al., 1993; Rockland and Lund, 1983). Other direct attempts at
network simulations of spontaneous fluctuations again relied on
clustered recurrent activations but emphasized the importance
of long-range, large-scale connectivity (Chaudhuri et al., 2014;
Deco et al., 2011; Ghosh et al., 2008). Finally, it is important to
clarify that the ultra-slow spontaneous fluctuations do not repre-
sent the entire repertoire of spontaneous, self-generated phe-
nomena in the brain. As we argue later, the slow, spontaneous
fluctuations can sometimes lead to spontaneous ignitions. How-
ever, in clear distinction from externally generated ignitions, such
self-generated ignitions are often preceded by a slow buildup of
subliminal activity.
To summarize, both modeling and experimental results raise
the possibility that the long timescales typical of ultra-slow spon-
taneous fluctuations are generated by neuronal accumulators
implemented by recurrent reverberations in excitatory cortical
circuits. As the spontaneous fluctuations appear to involve
each and every human cortical network, this suggests that the
recurrent accumulator mechanism is operating not only in spe-
cific, well-studied, accumulator circuits, e.g., in parietal and fron-
tal cortex, but in fact is a canonical property of most, if not all,
cortical areas (although with distinct timescales; Chaudhuri
et al., 2014; He et al., 2008).
Hypothesis: A Common Network Mechanism Underlying
Ignition and Resting-State Spontaneous Fluctuations
When considering together the possible mechanisms underlying
the activation threshold, the ignition and the spontaneous fluc-
tuations, it becomes evident that, despite their drastically
different dynamic nature, they could both potentially rely on
the same network mechanism: excitatory reverberatory loops.
Under such a hypothetical unification, the different dynamics
are explained as resulting from their relationship to the ignition
threshold. Thus, when the overall excitation of the reverberating
network exceeds the inhibitory or leakage ‘‘quench,’’ the
network ignites, i.e., rapidly enters into the active mode. Once
such a network is in the ignitedmode, its activity can remain sus-
tained through the intrinsic network reverberations and no longer
depends on the feed-forward drive (Barak and Tsodyks, 2007;
Dehaene and Changeux, 2005; Wong and Wang, 2006). The
observed return of such network to its pre-ignition baseline
may be explained by various mechanisms of adaptation, inhibi-
tory drive, or synaptic depression (e.g., Tsodyks et al., 1998).
By contrast, when the network activity remains below the ignition
threshold, the reverberating excitatory connections act essen-
tially as a low-pass filter with a long time constant (Goldman
et al., 2009), endowing the network with slow, persistent activity
that integrates the rapidly varying input noise typical of cortical
circuits (e.g., Marom, 2010) over long timescales.
Considering, side by side, the ignition dynamics that is
apparent during the active mode in response to a sensory
stimulation or task and the resting-state dynamics that emerges
in the absence of any stimulus or task, it thus appears that both
can be explained by the same mechanism: reverberatory
network dominated by excitatory connections. Under this hy-
pothesis, the transition between these drastically different
modes of cortical dynamics is set by the ignition threshold.
Whenever the overall network activity is driven above the posi-tive-feedback threshold (even in the absence of any stimulus),
it leads to the activemode. On the other hand, when there is min-
imal input drive, the excitatory feedback is tooweak to overcome
the inhibitory balance but is nevertheless sufficient to impose
long timescales in the storage of the intrinsically weak noise fluc-
tuations (Deco et al., 2011; Wang, 2002). The link between the
strength of input drive and fluctuations’ time constants appears
to be a natural property of recurrent networks, although, in the
case of sensory stimulation, there is a general shortening of time-
scales (e.g., Wong and Wang, 2006).
It should be emphasized that this unifying attempt—attributing
the active and resting-state dynamics to a single mechanism—
does not rule out the possibility that additional factors may differ-
entiate the active from the rest states. In particular, attention
and arousal mechanisms are enhanced during active states
and contribute to modulate network interactions. Such atten-
tional effects, involving the release of acetylcholine and other
neuromodulators, have been suggested to affect the distance
of intra-cortical communication, which, in turn, could modulate
the amplitude and dynamics of cortical network fluctuations
(Pinto et al., 2013). Indeed, in support of such effects, studies
in behaving primates have revealed that attentional modulation
can directly affect the amplitude of spontaneous fluctuations of
cortical neurons (Churchland et al., 2010; Cohen and Maunsell,
2009; Mitchell et al., 2009).
Consequences of the Proposed Hypothesis
Our proposed hypothesis points to the neuronal ignition
threshold as the critical parameter that separates the slow,
quasi-linear, accumulator dynamics (manifested in ultra-slow
resting-state fluctuations) from the rapid rise of non-linear bursts
of activity manifested during the active mode. Crucially, ignition
is also postulated to relate to conscious perception. Specifically,
it has been previously proposed that, when ignition occurs in a
network of cortical neurons, the corresponding content be-
comes subjectively available for conscious report. Alternative
models emphasize a global neuronal workspace (GNW) that
broadcasts a neural representation to many cortical sites (De-
haene and Changeux, 2011; Dehaene et al., 2003), or a more
local framework where the subjective content depends mainly
on ignition in content-selective representations (e.g., Noy et al.,
2015). The neuronal ignition threshold would, therefore, be the
physiological correlate of the threshold for content-specific
perceptual awareness, as defined psychophysically. This hypo-
thetical scheme leads to three main consequences. First, it
implies that any neuronal activity that occurs below this
threshold should remain subliminal, below the level of the partic-
ipant’s awareness. Under the present hypothesis, the sponta-
neous fluctuations, provided that their amplitude remains below
the ignition threshold, should, therefore, not be directly corre-
lated to reportable conscious events. This view, therefore,
predicts that, despite their robust and widespread nature, as re-
vealed in numerous BOLD imaging studies, resting-state activity
fluctuations should not be associated with a conscious feeling,
inasmuch as they remain at low subthreshold amplitude.
Several recent studies appear to support this counterintuitive
outcome of our hypothesis. Ramot et al. (2011) showed that
when participants rest with their eyes closed, the spontaneous,Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 199
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slow, drifting eye movements that emerge spontaneously upon
eye closure. Despite this significant BOLD-oculomotor link, par-
ticipants were completely unaware that such BOLD and oculo-
motor fluctuations were actually taking place.
An even more striking demonstration of the subliminal nature
of the spontaneous fluctuations has been demonstrated by Shi-
bata et al. (2011). This group used a real-time multivariate neuro-
feedback procedure in which participants were rewarded when-
ever their spontaneous fluctuations matched a target pattern
associated with a specific visual stimulus. Remarkably, partici-
pants were able to enhance the probability of appearance of
the target BOLD pattern and, furthermore, showed improved
perceptual sensitivity to the trained visual stimulus. However,
crucially, the participants were completely unaware of the occur-
rence of the spontaneously emerging BOLD pattern (despite the
fact that they were continuously rewarded for this pattern). When
prompted, they remained at chance in identifying the reward
pattern (e.g., deciding whether the biofeedback was elicited by
the activation pattern corresponding to a vertical or horizontal
grid).
A second strong consequence of our hypothesis, related to
the conjecture that the same reverberatory circuit could mediate
both spontaneous fluctuations and the network ignition, con-
cerns the transition between the spontaneous and active states.
Under the present hypothesis, if the spontaneous fluctuations
are high enough to approach the ignition threshold, then they
may cross it, initiating an ignition on the one hand and an overt
cognitive or behavioral event on the other.
A significant support for this conjecture is the finding that a
consistent signature of spontaneous or ‘‘voluntary’’ behaviors
(i.e., behaviors that do not depend on external sensory stimuli)
is an ultra-slow buildup of activity preceding such voluntary be-
haviors. In a model with continuously accumulating fluctuations,
this phenomenon is very natural: prior to crossing a threshold for
voluntary decision, the stochastic fluctuations must have accu-
mulated more or less steadily up to the threshold level (Schurger
et al., 2012). Such an event is illustrated in our simulation in
Figure 3D. Note the slow buildup anticipating the threshold
crossing under the ‘‘free-behavior’’ mode. Such phenomena
were studied particularly intensively in the case of voluntary de-
cisions to move, starting with the pioneering research of Korn-
huber and Deecke (1965), followed by Libet et al.’s (1983) series
of ‘‘free-will’’ studies. This research showed, using EEG record-
ings, that a slow potential—the so-called ‘‘readiness’’ poten-
tial—anticipates the decision of participants to initiate a move-
ment (see also Schurger et al., 2012; Figure 4B). While some
anticipatory buildup is to be expected in any dynamical system,
a consistent observation is that such buildup is strikingly slower
when generated freely, compared to when generated following
an external cue.
The aspect most relevant to our hypothesis, one that has been
repeatedly documented, is that participants are unaware of this
slowly developing neuronal build-up. Under our hypothetical
framework, such lack of awareness is readily explained by the
fact that the anticipatory signal remains below the ignition
threshold. These results have been further confirmed in single-
unit recordings in patients (Fried et al., 1997). Recent studies200 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.have revealed similar anticipatory buildups in BOLD imaging,
often lasting several seconds in duration (Bode et al., 2011;
Soon et al., 2008).
Significantly, the phenomenon of slow anticipatory buildup
prior to ‘‘voluntary’’ decisions is not confined to the motor
domain. Thus, recording single-neuron responses inmedial tem-
poral lobe structures during free recall of previously shown video
clips, Gelbard-Sagiv et al. (2008) found an anticipatory increase
in neuronal firing rate that preceded the recall event by several
seconds. Importantly, such long anticipatory buildup was abol-
ished when the participants directly viewed rather than freely re-
called the video clips (Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2008). This result is
depicted in Figure 4A.
In direct relation to our present hypothesis, it has been pro-
posed by Schurger et al. (2012) that the intriguing slow buildup
before voluntary decisions to move is compatible with the
assumption that these decisions occur when slow, spontaneous
fluctuations cross the decision threshold, thus simultaneously
entering awareness and leading to themotor response (Schurger
et al., 2012). The slow dynamics of the anticipatory signal is then
explained by the inherent ultra-slow character of the sponta-
neous fluctuations (Figure 4B). Schurger et al. (2012) supported
their hypothesis by demonstrating that unexpected interrupting
cues delivered during high activity peaks of the spontaneous
fluctuations resulted in accelerated responses, supporting the
notion that these fluctuations actually contribute, subliminally,
to voluntary decisions. Recently, in agreement with this view,
the influence of the slow fluctuations on the timing of awareness
was further described in a Libet-like experiment: transcranial
direct current (DC) stimulation in the angular gyrus and the pri-
mary motor cortex increased the neuronal excitability and the
spontaneous fluctuations’ amplitude, leading to faster aware-
ness of conscious motor intentions (Douglas et al., 2015).
A valid critique of the use of voluntary paradigms to study the
role of spontaneous fluctuations is that such paradigms do not
represent a true resting state, since the participants are involved
in a demanding (albeit voluntary) task. To circumvent this
problem, while indirectly monitoring the cognitive state of partic-
ipants, Yellin et al. (2015) opted to measure spontaneous fluctu-
ations in pupil diameter while subjects were resting with their
eyes open. Extensive previous research has documented direct
links between pupil diameter and cognitive load (Eldar et al.,
2013; Kahneman and Beatty, 1966; Kloosterman et al., 2015),
so that examining pupil diameter fluctuations during rest and
their relationship to spontaneous activity fluctuations could
potentially reveal some indication of the cognitive state of indi-
viduals without interfering with their resting state.
The results of this study confirmed and extended previous
observations of free behavior and are in line with our hypoth-
esis: pupil dilation events (presumably indexing spontaneously
emerging conscious thoughts) were preceded by a slow build-
up of BOLD activity in areas belonging to the default-mode
network (DMN) (Yellin et al., 2015). The DMN has, indeed, been
previously implicated in mind wandering and intrinsically ori-
ented thoughts (Mason et al., 2007; Preminger et al., 2011).
Furthermore, testing various models with different dynamics
led to the conclusion that the model that best fit the observed
correlation between BOLD and pupil diameter was, indeed, a
AB
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Figure 4. Three Examples Illustrating the
Slow Buildup of Activity Characteristic of
Spontaneous, Free Behaviors
(A) Slow buildup of single-neurons’ firing rate prior
to free recall of previously viewed videos in human
middle temporal lobe (MTL) (modified from Gel-
bard Sagiv et al., 2008). Note the strikingly slower
dynamics of the signal prior to free recall (bottom)
compared to the neuronal response following
actually presented video (top). H, hippocampus;
EC, entorhinal cortex.
(B) Slow buildup of EEG signal (readiness poten-
tial) that has been extensively studied during free
decisions to move (modified from Schurger et al.,
2012).
(C) Slow buildup of BOLD-fMRI signals recorded
in the human default mode network prior to
spontaneous pupil dilation during rest, presum-
ably associated with the generation of sponta-
neous thoughts during rest (modified from Yellin
et al., 2015).
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Perspectiveslow buildup of neuronal activity up to a threshold followed by
rapid neuronal activation (Yellin et al., 2015; Figure 4C). This
model is nicely compatible with the notion that subliminal non-
conscious spontaneous fluctuations become cognitively rele-
vant upon crossing a high-amplitude threshold. Thus, we find
converging lines of evidence suggesting that the ignition phe-
nomenon is not confined to sensory-driven representations but
can be detected in intrinsic networks as well, being linked then
to spontaneously emerging awareness of internal cognitive
processes such as spontaneous thoughts and free recall. Note
that, in this respect, our model extends the possibility of sponta-
neous, self-generated ignitions to the domain of spontaneously
emerging conscious thoughts. As in the case of other sponta-
neous behaviors, such thoughts are likely to be preceded by a
slow buildup of subliminal activity.
This set of converging findings consistently contrasts ultra-
long timescales during buildup of spontaneous behavior withNeuron 88the extremely short evolution of sensory-
or task-driven responses (compare, e.g.,
the active and free modes in Figure 4A).
This striking difference between the
active aware state on the one hand and
the ultra-slow, subliminal preparatory sig-
nals on the other—which have also been
a focus of intense cognitive and even phil-
osophical debates (Dennett, 2003; Libet,
1985; Shadlen, 2014)—is nicely explained
by our present hypothesis. In the absence
of external inputs, the ultra-slow sponta-
neous fluctuations are proposed to
contribute to the initiation of voluntary
‘‘free’’ decisions based on slow accumu-
lator-like anticipatory signals of which
participants remain unaware. By con-
trast, upon external sensory or task
activation, the reverberating network
is rapidly driven above the ignition
threshold, leading to its intense activation
concomitant with cognitive awareness.A third consequence of the current hypothesis concerns the
differential circuit dynamics found across cortical areas. While
we have so far emphasized the ‘‘canonical’’ principles that are
common across the entire constellation of human cortical net-
works, a potentially robust outcome of our hypothesis relates
to differences in neuronal dynamics across different cortical
areas and networks. Even at the level of anatomical connectivity,
which, under the present hypothesis, should play an important
role in mediating the reverberation dynamics, such differences
are evident. For example, examining the anatomical spread
of lateral anatomical connections at different levels of the visual
hierarchy in the monkey brain reveals a gradual increase in
the anatomical span as one moves to higher levels of the cortical
hierarchy (e.g., Amir et al., 1993). In the same line of ideas, in
the human brain, pyramidal cells become more branched
and spinous from the occipital lobe to the temporal lobe and
from the latter to the prefrontal lobe (Elston et al., 2001). A, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 201
Box 2. Future Directions
d Can a realistic model circuit integrate the concepts of evi-
dence accumulation and ignition, specifically demon-
strating (1) accumulation of noisy neuronal signals in a
quasi-linear manner, (2) threshold crossing, and (3) ignition
dynamics?
d How can we account for local ignition-like events that
apparently are dissociated from awareness (e.g., V1 bursts
of activity)?
d Can the concept of ignition be reconciled with the graded
nature of neural firing and the apparent dissociations be-
tween signal reduction (e.g., adaptation) and perceptual
awareness?
d What are the neuronal mechanisms by which an ignition is
‘‘broadcast’’ to the rest of the cortex?
d Can a causal relation be demonstrated between ultra-slow
spontaneous fluctuations in neuronal activity and the gen-
eration of free, self-generated, spontaneous behaviors,
such as free motor movements, free associations, and
spontaneously emerging insights?
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Perspectivestraightforward consequence of such changes in anatomical cir-
cuitry is an increasingly slower (more persistent) timescale of the
circuit storage mechanism. If, indeed, our hypothesis that the
slow spontaneous fluctuations and the supra-threshold sensory
activations are derived from the same reverberatory loops is
right, we should expect that, despite the striking differences in
the frequency contents of the two phenomena, changes in the
characteristic dynamics of the spontaneous fluctuations across
cortical sites should parallel similar changes in the dynamics of
their task-driven responses. A suggestion that this, indeed,
may be the case has been recently provided (Honey et al.,
2012). The authors recorded both ECoG responses (Honey
et al., 2012) and BOLD-fMRI responses (Stephens et al., 2013)
and demonstrated a hierarchy of increasingly slower accumu-
lator dynamics in neuronal responses to naturalistic stimuli
leading from auditory cortex to DMN structures. In agreement
with our hypothesis, they found a significant correlation between
the stimulus-driven dynamics and the ones found during resting-
state spontaneous fluctuations. Thus, cortical regions that re-
sponded in a sluggish manner to the naturalistic stimuli also
expressed slower frequencies in their spontaneous activity fluc-
tuations during rest. A similar relationship between the dynamics
of resting and task activations was found in a meta-analysis of
neuronal activity responses in monkey cortex (Murray et al.,
2014). It should be noted in this respect, that in our framework,
the sluggish nature of the frontal circuits will predict longer sub-
liminal buildup prior to active ignitions. Nevertheless, such slug-
gish buildup should not preclude the crossing of the ignition and
awareness threshold in these slow circuits as well.
However, a more extensive analysis of the relationship be-
tween task-driven and spontaneous dynamics will be needed
to better establish the possible common source of these two
modes of cortical activity. It will be particularly informative to
examine the dynamics of those aspects that may be more diag-
nostic of the storage capacity of the network; for example, the202 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.duration of the sustained activity following brief stimulus presen-
tations (e.g., Fisch et al., 2009).
Elaborations
Given the extreme complexity of cortical circuits, and the many
parameters that impact on their dynamics, the proposed hypoth-
esis should naturally be viewed as an oversimplification. Thus,
additional experiments (see also Box 2, ‘‘Future Directions’’)
and elaborations of the basic scheme proposed here should
be considered. Here, we point out three particularly prominent
ones and attempt to show how a simple extension of our hypoth-
esis could account for these complications.
A major indication that the all-or-none ignition hypothesis is an
oversimplification comes from the many observations that the
neuronal response during the active state can be graded. In
the perceptual domain, certain perceptual dimensions appear
to be continuous, such as motion velocity, contrast levels, and
so forth. In the neuronal domain, a ubiquitous case is the phe-
nomena of adaptation and ‘‘repetition suppression,’’ in which
the amplitude of neuronal responses to optimal stimuli can
be significantly reduced upon stimulus repetition (Grill-Spector
and Malach, 2004; Grill-Spector et al., 2006; Krekelberg et al.,
2006; Malach, 2012). Such graded responses indicate that addi-
tional parameters, such as network excitability levels on the one
hand and synaptic depression (e.g., Tsodyks and Markram,
1997) on the other, should be added to the simple all-or-none
feedback network activations. A plausible, more nuanced elab-
oration of the all-or-none ignition model could be implemented
in networks expressing multi-stable levels (e.g., Ghosh et al.,
2008; Hansen et al., 2015). Furthermore, as noted earlier, synap-
tic depression mechanisms may account for the termination of
the ignition response that, otherwise in a simple point-attrac-
tor-like model, would persist indefinitely.
A secondmajor discrepancy with the present hypothesis is the
observation that the neuronal buildup during voluntary behaviors
does not always lead to an ignition in the accumulator network
itself. For example, the readiness potential leading to a voluntary
decision to move does not appear to be followed by a non-linear
neuronal event that is associated with movement awareness
(Fried et al., 1997; Libet et al., 1983). Again, such observations
indicate that the assumption that accumulation and ignition
must always occur in the same network is likely an oversimplifi-
cation. A plausible scenario, also suggested for perceptual
decisions under uncertainty (Gold and Shadlen, 2007) and for
voluntary behavior in rodents (Murakami et al., 2014), is that
the voluntary decision may involve a cascade of reverberatory
loops, in which an upstream network may possess a higher igni-
tion threshold than its target area. Under such a scenario,
network fluctuations that remain below the ignition threshold in
one cortical area may, nevertheless, drive a downstream area
above its own (lower) ignition threshold, leading to voluntary
behavior associated with an ignition event that is anatomically
separated from the accumulator network. In a related proposal,
Lo and Wang (2006) propose that the readout of threshold-
crossing events could occur subcortically; for instance, in the
superior colliculus.
An interesting observation that may appear to contradict the
notion that high signal activity should correspond to conscious
Neuron
Perspectiveawareness concerns sleep states. In particular, it is well estab-
lished that, during non-rapid eye movement sleep (NREM),
peak neuronal activity does not diminish compared to the REM
and awake states (see, e.g., Nir et al., 2011; Ramot et al.,
2013). A plausible explanation for the lack of reportable experi-
ences during NREM sleep could be the frequent off-states,
which are characteristics of NREM sleep. Such off-states may
quench the ability of local high-amplitude signals to cascade
into a global brain-scale ignition, thus gaining access to memory
networks and, hence, preventing conscious recall (Nir et al.,
2011). A similar fragmentation of brain activity into locally pre-
served but globally incoherent states has been described with
intracranial recordings during human anesthesia (Lewis et al.,
2012).
Finally, while our model emphasizes the dynamic role of ex-
citatory connections and assumes a largely stationary impact
of the inhibitory drive, this is clearly an oversimplification, as
many studies have demonstrated a tight link between averaged
excitatory activity and neuronal inhibition (see, e.g., the reviews
Buzsa´ki et al., 2004; and Zhang and Sun, 2011). Thus, a more
realistic rendition of network activation under rest and sensory-
driven modes should consider a more dynamic and balanced
behavior of network inhibition.
To summarize, we propose here that a common mechanism,
recurrent positive-feedback loops, may account for two drasti-
cally different cortical dynamics. The ubiquity of these dynamics
across the cortex suggests that they reflect a canonical cortical
characteristic, i.e., common phenomena across all cortical cir-
cuits. They highlight the networks’ ignition threshold as a critical
aspect of cortical decision making and conscious awareness.SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
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